Written Contribution to Draft General Comment No. 38 — Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

CAMBODIA: INSTITUTIONAL DISMANTLING OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Submitted by Save Cambodia, on behalf of the Khmer community
15 July 2026

Section I. Cambodia and the Progressive Dismantling of Freedom of Association

Cambodia has become one of the clearest examples of how freedom of association can be systematically dismantled. For many years, the United Nations and its agencies, Cambodian and international human rights and labor rights organizations, trade unions, and civil society groups have documented the progressive elimination of independent voices, institutions, and meaningful alternatives capable of holding power accountable. The Hun Manet and Hun Sen regime have consolidated power to such an extent that meaningful democratic participation is no longer possible. To maintain that control, the regime has systematically dismantled the political opposition, used mass criminal proceedings against critics, restricted trade unions and civil society organizations, and closed or forced into exile independent media outlets. The cumulative effect has been the weakening or silencing of many of Cambodia's independent institutions and alternative civic participation spaces.

These measures have continued to deepen and increasingly extend beyond Cambodia's borders. The assassination of opposition parliamentarian Lim Kimya in Thailand on 7 January 2025, the repeated targeting and prosecution of trade union leader Rong Chhun, efforts to secure the return of exiled activists from neighboring states, and the creation of a new citizenship-revocation framework demonstrate that the suppression of independent voices is no longer confined within Cambodia itself. Methods previously directed at in-country opposition figures and critics now affect activists, dissidents, and diaspora communities abroad.[1][2]

Cambodia deserves particular attention because the consequences of dismantling freedom of association extend far beyond political parties, trade unions, journalists, and civil society organizations. As independent institutions and voices have been weakened, silenced, or removed, many of the mechanisms capable of holding power accountable have disappeared with them, and the effects are visible in broader governance failures, including corruption, sovereignty concerns that have contributed to transnational criminal activity, cyber scamming, trafficking networks and growing regional instability. Cambodia therefore demonstrates not only how freedom of association can be dismantled, but how the removal of independent institutions and voices can produce wider consequences for governance, accountability, and public life.

Section II. Cambodia’s Longstanding Erosion of Independent Voices and Institutions

Cambodia has been undergoing a decades-long process involving the removal of independent institutions capable of providing accountability, representing competing interests, and offering meaningful alternatives to the power base. Here are three key issues that illustrate how freedom of association has been progressively weakened through the removal of independent institutions and voices.

  1. Political Opposition and Democratic Participation

    Political opposition parties provide one of the main ways citizens express and organize around alternative political visions. In Cambodia, that channel has not merely been restricted, but it has been removed as a functioning part of political life. The dissolution of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) eliminated the country’s main opposition party from the political process, and opposition leaders, members, activists, and supporters have continued to face criminal prosecutions, political restrictions, exile, and mass trials.[3]

    This removal of political opposition became central to the control of the electoral process. The Commission of Inquiry for Cambodia previously emphasized that the Cambodian government’s claim of democratic legitimacy could not stand when at least 43 percent of Cambodian voters had supported the opposition before the CNRP was banned in 2017.[4] The United Nations later concluded that the 2023 national election could not be treated as free or fair without major reforms, after first issuing an Action Plan of reform measures that the government was expected to implement well before the election.

    Mass criminal proceedings became one of the principal mechanisms used to eliminate meaningful political competition, targeting more than 130 opposition figures and supporters. The removal of the CNRP, the continued exclusion of opposition leaders from political life, and the prosecution of opposition members created an electoral environment that the Special Rapporteur later described as being subject to systemic control by the ruling party and lacking genuine political competition.[5]

    By the time Hun Sen transferred power to his son, Hun Manet, the issue was no longer limited to prosecutions against individual opposition figures. The broader result was the removal of meaningful political competition, making effective political opposition and political choice increasingly impossible. The Commission of Inquiry and Khmer community advocacy, therefore, challenged the transfer of power as a “hereditary appointment” made after the elections that the United Nations had already called into serious question.

    More recent developments show that this political space has not reopened nor improved. Freedom House’s 2025 report rated Cambodia “Not Free,” assigning 4 of 40 for Political Rights and describing elections as taking place in a severely repressive environment.[6] In 2024, the Cambodian People’s Party won 55 of 58 contested Senate seats after the Candlelight Party was prohibited from competing. Former CNRP president Kem Sokha was convicted in March 2023 and sentenced to 27 years' imprisonment, stripped of his rights to vote and stand for election, and most recently in April 2026, the Court of Appeal left the sentence in place, extended his house arrest, and added a five-year international travel ban.[7] Cambodian opposition figures and political activists have also been forcibly returned, deported, or detained after being sent back from neighboring countries. These developments show that the elimination of political opposition has not been reversed but has become part of the structure of political control.

  2. Independent Trade Unions and Labor Organizing

    Independent trade unions allow workers to organize collectively, represent shared interests, and seek accountability for labor rights violations. For decades, labor leaders, union organizers, and workers have faced intimidation, violence, criminal prosecutions, and other forms of retaliation. These pressures have contributed to the weakening of independent workers’ representation and workers continue to encounter registration barriers, administrative delays, retaliation, and other obstacles that undermine their ability to establish and maintain independent unions.

    Union members from the Labor Rights Supported Union of Khmer Employees of NagaWorld (LRSU) illustrate these challenges. Following the dismissal of approximately 1,300 workers in 2021, workers have continued Cambodia's longest-running labor dispute. LRSU president Chhim Sithar served two years in prison, nine union members were convicted of incitement, and several colleagues continue to face the possibility of arrest despite repeated calls by international labor bodies, including the ILO, for the protection of union rights.[8]

    Cambodian labor organizations have documented broader patterns affecting workers' ability to organize independently, including delays in union registration, obstacles to legal recognition, retaliation against organizers, dismissals, and coerced resignations. As of early 2026, 36 union registration applications and 4 federation registration applications submitted by worker groups remained pending, with some applications unresolved for several years. Since 2024, more than 2,000 workers have reportedly been dismissed in connection with union activity.[9]

    Despite continued efforts by workers, trade unions, and labor organizations to organize independently, significant barriers to independent workers’ representation remain. The figures cited above do not reflect additional cases reported during 2026.

  3. Independent Media, Journalists and Public Information

    Independent media and journalists provide one of the main ways Cambodians receive information, debate public issues, and hear alternative political viewpoints. In 2022, OHCHR noted in their report State of Press Freedom in Cambodia, that restrictions on media freedom affect political participation and public debate.[10]

    The restriction of independent media has not only affected election reporting, over time, it has also narrowed public discussion and weakened public scrutiny and accountability on issues such as labor disputes, land conflicts, environmental issues, corruption, and human rights abuses. That same pattern is no longer limited to traditional political or human rights reporting, but similar pressure can be seen concerning transnational criminal activity, cyber-scam operations, sovereignty concerns, and the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute reportings. The issue is not only the closing of media outlets, but the narrowing of independent scrutiny across a growing range of matters of public concern.

Section III. Freedom of Association Beyond Individual Violations

Cambodia's experience suggests that freedom of association can be dismantled not only through restrictions imposed on individuals, but also through the progressive weakening or removal of the institutions through which citizens organize, participate in public life, represent shared interests, and receive independent information. Political opposition parties, independent trade unions, and independent media are often treated as separate issues, but they systematically reveal a broader process involving the concentration of political power, the dismantling of accountability mechanisms, and the narrowing of civic and political space.

Cambodia demonstrates that freedom of association should not be examined solely through individual violations involving activists, political leaders, journalists, or trade unionists. It shows how the progressive removal of independent institutions can reduce accountability, eliminate meaningful alternatives to concentrated power, and produce consequences that extend well beyond the institutions themselves. Article 22 should be understood not only as protecting individuals and associations from restrictions or reprisals, but also the institutional conditions that allow citizens to organize, participate in public life, represent shared interests, and access independent information.

[1] Human Rights Watch, Thailand: Cambodian Refugees Forcibly Returned (29 Nov. 2024).

[2] Human Rights Watch, Cambodia Finalizes Process to Arbitrarily Strip Citizenship (23 Jan. 2026).

[3] Amnesty International, Cambodia: Opposition Mass Trials (2021).

[4] Commission of Inquiry for Cambodia, citing UN Human Rights Committee findings.

[5] OHCHR, Cambodia: UN Human Rights Expert Concerned by Succession Plans, Urges Structural Reforms (Oct. 2023).

[6] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: Cambodia.

[7] Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Opposition Leader's Appeal Denied (30 Apr. 2026).

[8] Global Labor Justice, Labor Rights Defender Chhim Sithar and the NagaWorld Strikes.

[9] CENTRAL Labor Rights Monitoring Data (2026).

[10] OHCHR, State of Press Freedom in Cambodia (2022).

 

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